Automated Fault Localization for C Programs  by Griesmayer, Andreas et al.
Automated Fault Localization for C
Programs 1
Andreas Griesmayer, Stefan Staber, and Roderick Bloem
Graz University of Technology
{agriesma,sstaber,rbloem}@ist.tugraz.at
Abstract
If a program does not fulﬁll a given speciﬁcation, a model checker delivers a counterexample, a run which
demonstrates the wrong behavior. Even with a counterexample, locating the actual fault in the source code
is often a diﬃcult task for the veriﬁcation engineer.
We present an automatic approach for fault localization in C programs. The method is based on model
checking and reports only components that can be changed such that the diﬀerence between actual and
intended behavior of the example is removed. To identify these components, we use the bounded model
checker CBMC on an instrumented version of the program. We present experimental data that supports
the applicability of our approach.
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1 Introduction
Debugging is one of the most time consuming parts of the software development
cycle. Since the complexity of software systems is increasing, there is also an in-
creasing demand in tools that aid the programmer in the debugging process.
Debugging consists of three steps: detecting that the program contains a fault,
localizing the fault, and correcting the fault. Detecting faults has been an active
area of research. There exists less work on fault localization and correction. In this
work we focus on localization and present a novel method for determining the cause
of faults in C programs.
We assume that we are given a program written in C and a speciﬁcation. Suppose
the program contains a fault, and we have a counterexample showing that the
speciﬁcation does not hold. We use the counterexample to create an extended
version of the program. We ﬁx the inputs of the program according to the values
of the counterexample and introduce abnormal predicates for every component in
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the program. If the abnormal predicate of a component is true, we assume that
the component works abnormally. Therefore, we suspend the original behavior of
the component and replace it by a new input. The localization problem is then one
of ﬁnding which abnormal predicates need to be asserted and how the respective
components have to be replaced in order to fulﬁll the original speciﬁcation. In
order to ﬁnd abnormal predicates we negate the original speciﬁcation to state that
it is not possible to satisfy it by suspending components, and again use a model
checker to verify the new system. If we ﬁnd a failing run, we can derive from it
the components that work abnormally and a replacement such that the program is
ﬁxed for the original counterexample.
1.1 Related Work
The presented work is closely related to the theory of model-based diagnosis (MBD)
[21,16] which has its origins in diagnosing physical systems. Console et al. [4] show
the applicability of MBD to fault localization in logic programs. Much work has
been done in applying MBD to hardware designs on the source code level [9,25,20].
The theory has also been successfully applied to debugging programs written in
a subset of Java [19,18]. In MBD, a model is derived from the source code. The
model, together with a given failure trace, describes the actual, faulty behavior of the
program. The correct output for the trace must be provided by an oracle (typically
by the veriﬁcation engineer). Model based diagnosis yields a set of components
that explains the discrepancy between the model and the desired behavior but does
not give a replacement for those components. In our approach we do not require a
certain failure trace and an oracle that delivers the correct output values for that
trace. Instead we assume that a speciﬁcation is given and use a veriﬁcation tool to
obtain an arbitrary ﬁnite failure trace that proves that the speciﬁcation is violated.
We furthermore use the speciﬁcation to automatically derive a correct behavior for
that trace.
A related theory to model-based diagnosis was developed by Veneris, Smith, et
al. See, for instance, [7]. They use a SAT solver to diagnose sequential circuits but
do not consider speciﬁcations: the user must provide the proper behavior of the
circuit for a given counterexample.
One application of diagnosis is design rectiﬁcation. Huang and Cheng [13] de-
velop a theory to locate sites at which a circuit can be modiﬁed to satisfy a new
speciﬁcation. In their case, the speciﬁcation is given as another circuit.
In [15,23] a game based approach is presented for debugging. Using an LTL
speciﬁcation, the approach is able to locate a fault and provide a correction that is
valid for all possible input values. Recently, this work was extended to pushdown
systems to handle recursive Boolean programs. Details on the approach and its
application to abstractions from C programs, are given in [10]. The problem of
ﬁnding a correction that is valid for all inputs is computationally hard and therefore
the approach is less eﬃcient than the one presented in this paper, where we only
provide a correction for the considered counterexamples.
Other existing work uses the diﬀerence between traces for fault localization.
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Renieris and Reiss [22] assume the existence of a faulty trace and a number of
successful traces. The diﬀerence between the traces points to suspicious parts of the
program. Experimental data show that the quality of the fault localization strongly
depends on the given set of traces. In the work of Groce [11] a speciﬁcation is
used to generate a successful trace that is as close as possible to a counterexample.
The diﬀerence between failing and successful traces serves as a basis to explain the
fault. Experimental data shows quite good results of their approach although for
some examples manual assumptions have to be added in order to obtain insightful
explanations. Comparison to our work can be found in Section 4. In [26], Zeller’s
delta debugging approach is used to obtain a cause-eﬀect chain of a fault. The
diﬀerences between states in heuristically chosen points of interest in a failing and
a successful program run deliver an explanation for the fault. Ball et al. [1] use
multiple calls to a model checker and compare the obtained counterexamples to a
successful trace. Transitions that do not appear in a correct trace are reported as
a possible cause for the fault.
All approaches that use the diﬀerence between traces need a successful run that
is either generated or given by the user. The reported statements are fragments of
the code present in the failing run but not in a successful runs. It is not guaranteed
that the real fault location is reported or that the fragment of the code is minimal.
It is possible that diﬀerent failing runs lead to diﬀerent fault candidates without
a shared candidate. In contrary to these approaches, we do not compare runs on
diﬀerent inputs, but start with a counterexample and look for a minimal change
in the program in order to generate a successful run with the same inputs. Thus,
every reported location is a potential fault candidate and can be used to ﬁx the
fault for the used counterexample. It is guaranteed that the real fault is in the
set of found candidates (assuming that the fault is in the considered fault model,
c.f. 2.1). Therefore, we rerun the process on multiple counterexamples and use the
intersection of the results to narrow down the number of fault candidates.
Other existing work does not report possible fault locations, but rather gives
a deeper understanding of the nature of a failure. In [14] segments of the coun-
terexample are identiﬁed that force the error to occur. Zeller and Hildebrandt [27]
point out the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between a failure inducing program input and a
successful input. Groce and Visser [12] generate and analyze similar versions of a
program run (successful and faulty runs) in order to obtain more information about
the cause of the failure.
In the next section, we give the details of our approach in the general case.
Section 3 gives the instantiation for the case of localizing faults in C programs
as well as details on the used tools and methods. We show the applicability of
the approach in Section 4 by examining two examples and explaining the gathered
results. We conclude and give some outlook for future work in Section 5.
A. Griesmayer et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 174 (2007) 95–111 97
2 Fault Localization by Model Checking
In this section we describe, in general terms, how a model checker can be used for
fault localization. Eﬃciency is not our prime concern in this section. In section 3
we give a speciﬁc instantiation of the approach to localize faults in C programs.
2.1 Preliminaries
We have a system S which consists of a set of components C = {c0, . . . , cn−1}
and a set of signals V = VS ∪ VND. Signal vi ∈ VS is deﬁned by the component
ci as function fi(V ), signals in VND are chosen nondeterministically and describe
inputs or nondeterministic behavior of the system. (In the following, we refer to
both inputs and nondeterminism in the system as “inputs”.) The exact deﬁnition
of components and signals depends on the application domain. For hardware, for
example, one can deﬁne the components to be gates and signals to be wires. (Cf.
[15,23].) We assume that the system is sequential and operates in discrete time.
That is, a run of the system is a countable sequence of valuations of the signals,
including inputs and nondeterministic choices.
Besides the system, we are given a speciﬁcation, which is a safety property ϕ. If
the system does not fulﬁll ϕ, a model checker gives us a counterexample π: a ﬁnite
sequence of assignments to signals in VC ⊆ VND such that the system violates the
speciﬁcation.
We view the violation of the speciﬁcation as a contradiction between the behavior
speciﬁed by ϕ and that prescribed by S. Components of the system can be changed
according to a fault model, which describes the allowed changes in behavior. E.g.
a possible fault model for circuits: a replacement of a gate by a NAND or a NOR
gate. We call a component that can be changed such that the error is avoided (while
the rest of the system stays unchanged) a single fault diagnosis. The set of all such
components is called the diagnosis set for single faults. We naturally extend this
notation to tuples of components for dual or multiple faults.
2.2 Approach
Our approach consists of the following steps.
(i) We choose a parameter m that deﬁnes how many components may be changed
in order to generate a system which obeys the speciﬁcation. E.g., if m = 1 we
look for single faults.
(ii) We construct a new system S′. System S′ is obtained from S by making two
modiﬁcations.
First, we build V ′
ND
= VND \ VC and V
′
S
= VS ∪ VC by adding components
to assign the values given by the counterexample to VC . Note that the method
how to do that depends on the system and the used model checker. While
for hardware we usually have values for all nondeterministic signals and time
steps, a model checker for software only gives values for a single trace through
the program and gives no informations on statements that were not reached.
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Second, we add to V ′
ND
new signals ab0, . . . , abn−1 with Boolean domain and
for every vi ∈ VS a signal nd i with the same domain as vi. We further replace
the function fi of ci by f
′
i = ¬abi∧fi∨abi∧nd i. Thus, if abi = true, we suspect
component ci to be incorrectly chosen and suspend the original behavior of the
component. If abi = false the component works as prescribed by the system.
(iii) We construct a new speciﬁcation, ϕ′ = ¬ϕ∧ (
∑
i
abi ≤ m). The negated spec-
iﬁcation ϕ′ states that ϕ is violated in the modiﬁed system when a maximum
of m components are suspended, i.e. there is no possibility to change maximal
m components such that ϕ is fulﬁlled. (We identify true with the number 1.)
(iv) We ask the model checker to produce a counterexample π′ that shows that S′
does not satisfy ϕ′.
Suppose that a counterexample π′ for ϕ′ and S′ exists. The relevant part of
the counterexample is the valuation of the abi and nd i. The set of components
{ci | abi = true} is called a diagnosis. The existence of counterexamples shows
that S does not contradict ϕ when a component in the diagnosis is suspended. If
we replace the ci in the diagnosis with a component that behaves like nd i, the
resulting system satisﬁes ϕ under the inputs prescribed by π′. Note that inputs
from π′ adhere to those from π if present. Thus, our claim is that the diagnosis
found by our approach only contains components that can be used to ﬁx the system
for the given counterexample. Obviously, there is no guarantee that all we can
ﬁx the system regardless of the inputs. Finding a diagnosis that is valid for all
counterexamples is much harder [15,23].
If no counterexample π′ exists, then the system cannot be ﬁxed by replacing only
m components. Typically, we start with m = 1, increasing m whenever diagnosis
fails. To obtain all components, we can run the model checker several times, each
time excluding the elements of the diagnosis already found. This is usually wasteful,
as it forces many recomputations that can often be avoided by a small modiﬁcation
of the model checker.
2.3 Discussion
The theory presented here is quite general. It is not restricted to ﬁnite domains,
as long as the modiﬁcations mentioned in point ii can be expressed. Likewise, the
restriction that a signal is deﬁned by exactly one component is unnecessary. If it is
removed, general constraint systems can be diagnosed [8].
The requirement that the system be a sequential, discrete-time system is quite
relaxed: real time programs ﬁt this requirement as a time step can be taken to be
the execution of a single statement. Dense time (analog) systems are not amenable
to our approach. Some possible application domains are sequential circuits, Boolean
programs as used in [2] (cf. [17]) and C programs, which are the topic of this paper.
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Listing 1: Loop Unwind
1 index = 0;
if (!( index<5)) goto end;
printf (”%d”,index);
index++;
if (!( index<5)) goto end;
6 printf (”%d”,index);
index++;
if (!( index<5)) goto end;
printf (”%d”,index);
index++;
11 if (!( index<5)) goto end;
assert (false );
end:
3 Fault Localization for C Programs
In order to apply the approach to C programs, we ﬁrst give a short description on
the used model checker CBMC and bounded model checking for software. Subsec-
tion 3.2 presents our approach to ﬁnding faults in C programs, which is a variation
on the general approach described in the last section.
3.1 CMBC
To implement fault localization for C, we use the software model-checker CBMC
[3]. CBMC takes ANSI-C source code as input and handles pointers, arrays, and
the C data-types without requiring abstraction. Speciﬁcation is done using assert
statements. CBMC adheres to the C semantics very precisely. Uninitialized vari-
ables, for example, introduce nondeterminism in the model, as do constructs for
which the C standard is ambiguous.
Given a C program P and a bound k, CBMC constructs an unwinding Pk of the
program in which every statement is executed at most once. Loops are unwound by
creating k copies of the loop along with the proper if statements for the case that
the loop requires fewer than k iterations. Backward goto statements and recursive
calls are dealt with similarly.
Listing 1 gives the result of unwinding the following loop to a depth of 3:
for(index = 0; index<5; index++)
printf (”%d”,index);
The assert in Line 12 is an unwind assertion, which is added by CBMC to
decide whether or not the unwinding is deep enough. If it is violated, we found a
run which traverses the loop more than three times. We have to call CBMC again
with a higher bound for the unwinding.
In the unwound program, CBMC supports assume statements as well as assert
statements. CBMC turns the unwound program into a propositional logic formula
that is satisﬁable if and only if there is an execution of the program that ends
in the violation of an assert statement and satisﬁes all assume statements that it
encounters. Satisﬁability is checked by a standard SAT solver.
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3.2 Fault Localization
Suppose we are given a counterexample that shows that an assertion is violated.
The counterexample includes the values of the inputs and the nondeterministic
constructs. Such a counterexample can be obtained from CBMC . As before, we
will treat nondeterministic constructs and input values alike. We regard to the
values chosen by the counterexample as i0, . . . , il−1.
Our choice of components is the set of expressions in the program, i.e., the right-
hand sides of assignments, the conditions in if, while, and case statements, etc. Let
us assume we have n such components: e0 through en−1. Obviously, the choice of
signals for our model are the variables.
The process of building the instrumented program includes unwinding to the
depth k. We now construct P ′
k
according to the rules deﬁned in Section 2.2 as
follows:
The number of components that may be changed at a time determine how to
instrument the code. In the following, we give the approach for single faults. The
extension to multiple faults is straightforward and described in Section 3.4.
We change P to P ′ by declaring a new variable diag at the beginning of P ′,
whose value is chosen nondeterministically in the range of {0, . . . , n − 1}. We
further replace each expression ei by the expression (diag == i ? nondet() : ei)
where nondet() returns a nondeterministic value. The value of diag determines
which expression is suspended while at the same time all others behave as in the
original program P .
The instrumented program is unwound by CBMC resulting in P ′
k
. Finally, we
use the assignments in counterexample π to set the respective variables in P ′
k
We negate the speciﬁcation by ensuring that we report exactly those runs which
do not violate any assertion in P ′
k
. Because an unwound program does not con-
tain any loops, we can do so by adding a statement assert(false) to the end of
P ′
k
and replacing every assert statement assert(c) in Pk by an assume statement
assume(c) in P ′
k
.
The new counterexample again is computed using CBMC. If no new counterex-
ample is found we can look for dual faults or increase the number of unwinds.
Keeping the unwind assertion unchanged in the previous step helps to adjust the
correct number of unwinds.
The expressions in the diagnosis are exactly those that can be changed to satisfy
the counterexample for a otherwise unchanged program. Note that we do not ﬁx
the choices of the nondeterministic constructs in Pk that are not visited by the
counterexample — by changing the condition of a branching statement, we still
can ﬁnd paths that contain nondeterminism. We thus report all expressions for
which there is a successful execution of Pk for some choice of the nondeterministic
components respecting the choices made in the counterexample. (A more precise
method would check that the execution is successful regardless of the behavior of
the remaining nondeterministic components, but this introduces mixed quantiﬁers
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Listing 2: A simple C program P = Pk
void main() {
int a,b,c,d;
3 if (a){ /∗ nondeterministic choice ∗/
a = 5;
b = 6;
c = a + b;
d = a ∗ b;
8 if (a % 2 == 0){
int e;
a = e; /∗ nondeterministic assignment ∗/
}
assert (c == 12 && d == 36);
13 }
}
and is hard to compute.)
The full diagnosis for a given counterexample is built iteratively: when an ex-
pression is found, we add an assume statement to the program code to avoid that
the same component is reported a second time. CBMC is run repeatedly until no
more expressions are found. A more eﬃcient way would be to add blocking clauses
to the SAT instance.
3.3 Example
In the following we illustrate our approach using a simple C program. Listing 2
shows a program P that adds and multiplies the variables a and b. As speciﬁcation
we use an assert statement in Line 12. In Line 4, a is assigned 5, which is incorrect
and should be 6. Note that there are no loops in the code and thus Pk = P .
Assume that the counterexample sets a, b, c, d to the values 1, vb, vc, and vd,
respectively. (Values vb, vc, and vd are irrelevant, a can be set to any nonzero
value.) Listing 3 shows P ′
k
. In Line 3 the new variable diag is introduced. The
counterexample is ﬁxed in Line 6, but no value is ﬁxed for e in Line 14. The
statement assert(false) is added to the end of the program and each expression is
replaced to include the appropriate check for the diag variable. The numbers used
for the expressions correspond to the line numbers in Listing 2.
A run of a model checker on P ′
k
provides us with a counterexample with diag
equals 4 and nondet() returns the value 6. It also enters the then-block of the if
statement in Line 13 and assigns an nondeterministic value to e, and in the following
also to a. Those last two assignments do not aﬀect the speciﬁcation and therefore
are arbitrary. We see that the assignment to a in Line 6 is the correct value for all
possible counterexamples. While in general wi have to ﬁnd a expression which is
valid for all possible counterexamples, in this example we can use this information
directly to ﬁx the original program: We replace the value 5 by 6 in Line 4 of
Listing 2. There are no other diagnoses.
3.4 Dual fault Diagnosis
The extension of the approach for two (or more) faults is quite simple. We add two
variables diag1 and diag2 instead of one; both are assigned to a nondeterministic
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Listing 3: Modiﬁed unwound C program P ′
k
1 void main() {
int a,b,c,d;
int diag;
diag = nondet();
6 a = 1; b = vb; c = vc; d = vd;
if (diag == 3 ? nondet() : a){
a = (diag == 4 ? nondet() : 5);
b = (diag == 5 ? nondet() : 6);
11 c = (diag == 6 ? nondet() : (a + b));
d = (diag == 7 ? nondet() : (a ∗ b));
if (diag == 8 ? nondet() : (a % 2))}
int e;
a = (diag == 10) ? nondet() : e;
16 }
assume(c == 12 && d == 36);
}
assert (false );
}
value independently. An expression is in the diagnosis if one of the diag variables is
set to its number. The rest of the approach is analogous to the single fault diagnosis
described above.
To prevent every expression from being detected twice, we include the require-
ment that diag1 < diag2. Furthermore, we ﬁrst perform single fault diagnosis and
exclude all tuples {diag1, diag2} such that diag1 or diag2 is in the single-fault diag-
nosis.
3.5 Discussion
By using expressions as components, we get a ﬁne grained and quite natural model
for localization of the fault. Examining expressions allows us to localize faults in
assignments, function calls and return statements as well as in conditions for if-
statements or loops. Because we do not only examine if an expression contributes
to a fault, but also if it is possible to change it to avoid the fault, our results are
more exact than comparable methods. The corrected version of the program in
Listing 2 assigns 6 to variable a in Line 7. Groce [11], Zeller [26], Ball et al. [1],
and the dynamic slice [24] for this example comprise all assignments from Line 4 to
Line 7 while we are able to correctly pinpoint the fault to Line 4.
To ﬁnd a diagnosis, we have to express a possible replacement for a expression.
While it is relatively easy to do so for expressions or left hand sides of assignments,
structural errors such as missing statements of forgotten braces for if-statements of
loops are very hard to localize while more coarse methods might give a rough area
of the program to be examined by the veriﬁcation engineer.
Our approach returns all expressions that can be changed such that we can
generate a correct run from a given counterexample. Note that in case of a faulty
value which is propagated through the program, it is not possible to tell which
of the involved expressions is to change if the program is weakly speciﬁed. Again
have a look at the example in Listing 2. If we change the assert in Line 12 to
assert(d == 36), it is not possible to tell if the fault is located in Line 4 or Line 7.
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Table 1
Results of the TCAS task of the Siemens Test Suite.
#TC #diag Time Score
v1 131 15 (17-19) 2953 0.906
v2 69 5 (11-18) 836 0.975
v3 23 7 (13-19) 423 0.956
v4 20 15 (18-19) 576 0.906
v5 10 7 (17-18) 159 0.956
v6 12 13 (16-17) 253 0.919
v7 36 4 ( 9-18) 743 0.975
v8 1 19 (19-19) 26 0.886
v9 9 9 (10-11) 114 0.944
v10 14 12 (17-19) 269 0.925
v11 14 5 (10-14) 162 0.969
v12 70 7 (16-19) 1664 0.956
v13 4 9 (17-19) 149
v14 50 4 ( 4- 4) 594
v15 10 7 (17-17) 283 0.956
v16 70 15 (17-18) 1263 0.906
v17 35 4 ( 9-18) 1300 0.975
v18 29 4 ( 3-17) 499 0.975
v19 19 4 ( 9-17) 691 0.975
v20 18 15 (18-19) 748 0.906
#TC #diag Time Score
v21 16 15 (17-17) 585 0.906
v22 11 8 ( 8- 8) 223 0.950
v23 41 9 ( 9- 9) 885 0.944
v24 7 15 (16-17) 254 0.906
v25 3 8 ( 9- 9) 68 0.950
v26 11 8 (16-19) 311 0.950
v27 10 7 (17-18) 153 0.956
v28 75 2 (10-19) 642 0.988
v29 18 3 ( 9-18) 224 0.981
v30 57 4 (10-17) 939 0.975
v31 14 14 (15-16) 449 0.913
v32 2 14 (16-16) 39 0.925
v33 89 4 ( 8-19) 892 0.369
v34 77 7 (16-18) 1906 0.956
v35 75 2 (10-19) 1069 0.988
v36 123 2 ( 2- 3) 877
v37 93 5 ( 9-19) 822 0.969
v39 3 8 ( 9- 9) 66 0.950
v40 123 9 (10-15) 3017 0.944
v41 20 15 (18-19) 956 0.906
Thus, we see that proper speciﬁcation greatly improves the results of the approach.
In order to produce a reliable diagnosis, we consider all assert statements of a
program.
4 Examples
We show the applicability of the approach by considering two examples: The fol-
lowing section shows the results from the TCAS task of the Siemens test suite [6].
The Siemens suite contains ﬁve tasks which are widely used in literature. Each
task consists of a C program and several versions of it with faults introduced. The
position and kind of the faults is known. Besides the source-ﬁles, a number of test
cases along with the information which of the code versions pass them is provided.
In the second example, we check the implementation of a data structure. Section
4.2 gives the details of a Red-Black Tree, its properties and how to check them by
assertions.
All programs were checked automatically. If not stated otherwise, all instru-
mentation was done by scripts. If we had multiple test cases for one program, the
full state space was examined only for the ﬁrst test case. On subsequent test cases,
the search was restricted to the diagnosis calculated from previous test cases as
motivated in Section 3.2.
4.1 TCAS
The TCAS task of the Siemens test suite constitutes an aircraft collision avoidance
system. It consists of about 250 lines of code. To check the eﬀectiveness of fault
detecting tools, the authors of the suite created 41 versions of the program. Each
was created manually by adding one or more faults, usually a change in a single
line. In the following we will refer to the versions by “v1” to “v41”. The suite also
contains a set of 1600 test cases and their results on each of the TCAS-versions.
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Because no speciﬁcation is given, we use failing test cases as counterexamples
and the correct value for the test case as speciﬁcation. Except for v38, for which
no test case is given, the test suite provides between 3 and 130 failing test runs
for each program version, 1500 in total. The program contains 34 expressions in
assignments and conditions, which were identiﬁed as potential cause of an error and
instrumented as described above.
Table 1 gives the number of test cases for each version of TCAS. The third
column presents the size of the ﬁnal diagnosis as well as the variation of the size of
the diagnoses if they are calculated for each test case separately. The time in the
fourth column gives the overall calculation time for each TCAS version. Note that
in most cases a subset of the test cases would result in the same ﬁnal diagnosis.
Thus, a proper choice of test cases to consider would signiﬁcantly decrease the
calculation time. As such a choice would require analysis of the test cases, and
we do not concentrate on performance, all available test cases were considered for
computation.
The last column gives the result from the scoring function proposed by [22]. It
is based on program dependency graphs (PDG) and gives the distance between the
elements reported in the diagnosis and the faulty statements as number in the range
0 – 1. Higher numbers are better. For three of the of the versions it is not possible
to calculate this score because the fault is located in a #deﬁne statement and thus
is not part of the PDG. All of the scores are quite good except for v33. We get the
low score in v33 because in that example, the fault is a wrong index in initializing
array elements in four lines that were not reported by our single fault approach.
Despite the low rank, the result contains the only statement accessing the array and
thus seems quite useful.
In [11], Groce gives the scores for 5 versions of TCAS, for which his approach
is applicable, and compares them with results from Renieris and Reiss [22]. Groce
compares several methods with and without delta slicing and additional assump-
tions, we summarize the results in Figure 1. The vertical axis gives the result of the
scoring function of Renieris [22], which is reciprocally proportional to the amount of
code the user has to review when he starts at the given results. If a method reaches
100%, the fault is located most accurate. Note that while all approaches give good
results for some of the examples, only the approach presented in this paper scores
best or second for all of them.
We will now have a closer look at v2, its source code is given in Listing 4.
Functions that are not important for the example and initialization of the variables
are omitted. Constants are written in capital letters, global variables representing
input values from the test case start with a capital letter, and local variables start
with lower case letters. The failure was introduced in function Inhibit Biased Climb,
Line 4 by confusing two constants, the original version is shown as annotation in
the line above.
We demonstrate the fault with an error trace with 72 states reported by CBMC:
It enters the body of the if-statement in Line 40. The call to NCB Climb in Line 42 is
irrelevant as the test case is such that OBT() returns false and thus the assignment
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Fig. 1. Comparison of results from the TCAS examples with Groce and Renieris and Reiss
to need upward RA is false. In Line 43, NCB Descend is called which subsequently
calls the function containing the fault, Inhibit Biases Climb. The fault has the
eﬀect that up pref is assigned true instead of false in Line 23 which results in a
wrong assignment of false to result in Line 25 which is returned in Line 29. Thus,
need downward RA in Line 43 is assigned false instead of true. This leads to the
condition false in Line 48 and thus to setting the wrong return value in Line 51.
For this version of TCAS, we examined 69 test cases, each giving us a diagnoses
with 10 to 18 elements. The ﬁnal diagnosis found by our approach is the condition
and left expression in Line 4 and Lines 8, 43, and 53 shown underlined. We examine
if we can remove the error for the counterexample in each of the lines given as
diagnosis:
• Line 53 is obvious, if we return DOWNWARD RA in all cases, the assertion will
not be violated anymore. In fact, a return statement of an erroneous function, or
its call statement, can always be replaced by a call to a function which implements
the correct behavior.
• If we set need downward RA to true in Line 43, we enter the correct else branch
and return the correct value (need upward RA is false in the counterexample at
hand).
• A repair in Line 8 is more complicated. A look at the counterexample showed
that to remove the error, function OBT has to return false when called in Line 42,
and true when called in Line 25. Because OBT compares two input variables,
it should always return the same values within a run. A repair at this position
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Listing 4: TCAS v2
1 int Inhibit Biased Climb ()
2 {
3 //return (Climb Inh ? Up Sep + NOZCROSS : Up Sep);
4 return (Climb Inh ? Up Sep + MINSEP : Up Sep);
5 }
6
7 bool OBT()
8 { return (Own Tracked Alt < Other Tracked Alt); }
9
10 bool NCB Climb()
11 { /∗declarations omitted∗/
12 up pref = Inhibit Biased Climb() > Down Sep;
13 if (up pref)
14 result = !(OBT()) || ((OBT()) && (!(Down Sep >= ALIM())));
15 else
16 result = OAT() && (CV Sep >= MINSEP)
17 && (Up Sep >= ALIM());
18 return result;
19 }
20
21 bool NCB Descend()
22 { /∗declarations omitted∗/
23 up pref = Inhibit Biased Climb() > Down Sep;
24 if (up pref)
25 result = OBT() && (CV Sep >= MINSEP)
26 && (Down Sep >= ALIM());
27 else
28 result = !(OAT()) || ((OAT()) && (Up Sep >= ALIM()));
29 return result;
30 }
31
32 int alt sep test ()
33 { /∗declarations omitted∗/
34 enabled = High Conf && (OTA Rate <= OLEV)
35 && (CV Sep > MAXALTDIFF);
36 tcas eq = Other Capability == TCAS TA;
37 intent not known = Two of Three Reports Valid
38 && Other RAC == NO INTENT;
39 alt sep = UNRESOLVED;
40 if (enabled && ((tcas eq && intent not known) || !tcas eq))
41 {
42 need upward RA = NCB Climb() && OBT();
43 need downward RA = NCB Descend() && OAT();
44 if (need upward RA && need downward RA)
45 alt sep = UNRESOLVED;
46 else if (need upward RA)
47 alt sep = UPWARD RA;
48 else if (need downward RA)
49 alt sep = DOWNWARD RA;
50 else
51 alt sep = UNRESOLVED;
52 }
53 return alt sep;
54 }
55
56 main(int argc, char∗argv)
57 { initialize ();
58 /∗ initialization of global variables omitted∗/
59 assert ( alt sep test ()==DOWNWARD RA);
60 }
seems unsuitable.
• The remaining elements of the diagnosis are the condition of the conditional
statement in Line 4 and the expression where we introduced the fault in the same
line. The condition is part of the diagnosis because the fault was introduced
by wrongly using the larger constant MINSET instead of the smaller constant
NOZCROSS. Thus, in the test cases leading to a wrong behavior, the return
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Table 2
Results of the TCAS task for dual fault diagnosis.
#TC #diag Time
v6 12 4 ( 4- 5) 118
v8 1 1 ( 1- 1) 6
v9 9 5 ( 5- 7) 129
v16 70 4 ( 4- 5) 889
v22 11 6 ( 6- 8) 184
v23 42 5 ( 5- 6) 588
v24 7 1 ( 1- 1) 44
#TC #diag Time
v25 3 10 (10-12) 82
v31 14 4 ( 4- 5) 177
v32 2 5 ( 5- 6) 20
v36 126 6 ( 6- 8) 1975
v39 3 10 (10-12) 74
v40 126 6 ( 6-15) 2722
value of Inhibit Biased Climb was too high. By changing the condition to always
select the second expression, which does not have this constant, we circumvent
this behavior.
Although there is some work left for the veriﬁcation engineer to decide which is the
best position to repair the program, we see that the approach gives good results
that only point to positions where we have the possibility to remove the failure.
In addition to the diagnosis, the approach gives us the value of nondet() that
was chosen to avoid the wrong behavior for each of the identiﬁed expressions. This
information is valuable to understand how to repair the program. In the example
above, the condition of the conditional statement in Line 4 always selects the second,
smaller, expression for return. To avoid the fault, we can also we replace the left
expression by a negative value, indicating that the returned value should be smaller.
Other versions of TCAS give even better replacements for the faulty expression.
E.g. in version 7, the fault was introduced by initializing a constant by 501 instead
of 500. Examination of the suggested value for this line resulted in the correct
assignment of 500 in order to remove the fault for all test cases.
4.1.1 Dual Faults
In addition to single fault diagnosis, we looked for diagnoses where exactly two
expressions are replaced. The results are given in Table 2. Direct comparison with
the results from Table 1 shows that the time needed for calculations of an example
is quite comparable to the single fault case. Although a single run of CMBC takes
about three times the time of single fault diagnosis, the overall runtime remains
constant because the smaller size of the diagnosis rapidly leads to a smaller set of
expressions to check (less calls of CBMC).
4.2 Red-Black Tree
A Red-Black tree is a self-balancing data-structure whose operations for insert,
remove and search are performed in O(n log n) time [5]. It is a self-balancing binary
search tree where each node has an color attribute. In addition to the requirements
for binary search trees, following additional requirements have to be satisﬁed.
(i) A node is either RED or BLACK.
(ii) The root is BLACK.
(iii) All leaves are BLACK.
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(iv) Both children of every RED node are BLACK.
(v) All paths from any given node to its leaf nodes contain the same number of
BLACK nodes.
Insert-, remove- and search-operations are implemented as with usual binary search
trees. After such an operation, the tree is examined to check if it is consistent
with the rules above. If not, constant time rotation and repainting operations are
performed to restore the consistency. This ensures that the tree remains balanced
and guarantees the time bounds.
We took the implementation to check from the Wikipedia entry on Red-Black
trees 2 , and added the speciﬁcation in form of assert statements as follows:
rule (ii): single assertion after a insert operation.
rule (iv) and binary search tree order: after insert operations, a routine is called
which traverses the tree. If a red node is found, it checks that both children are
black. The same routine also performs a comparison of the values to ensure the
correct order of the binary search tree.
pointer access: Some of the functions implicitly assume that they are called with
valid pointers. Assertions were added to ensure that pointers are not NULL when
their ﬁelds are accessed even in the presence of faults in the code.
We don’t have to check rule (i) as every node is initialized with color RED and only
reassigned to RED or BLACK. Rule (iii) is always true because NULL pointers are
treated as BLACK leafs. Rule (v) is not checked in this example.
Note that all of the assert statements are present in the source code at the same
time, allowing only diagnoses which satisfy all of them. The example was tested
by examining some test cases where nodes are inserted in an empty tree in the
following order (the description gives the assumed operations on a full functioning
data structure):
0,5 This simple case initializes the tree with a node with value 0 and adds a new
node with value 5 as its right child. No repainting or rotation of the node is
necessary.
5,1 Analogous to the ﬁrst test case, but the second node is inserted as left child of
the root node.
5,1,2 The last operation creates an unbalanced tree. To restore the properties of
Red-Black trees, two rotations and a reassignment of the colors are necessary.
5,9,4,6 The last insertion creates a balanced tree, but one RED node has a RED
child, which contradicts Rule iv. To restore the properties, a reassignment of the
colors in two passes is necessary.
The source code implementing Red-Black trees consists of approximately 250
lines of code. Because the data-structure uses pointers to connect the nodes, di-
agnosis on even this small examples showed to be quite hard. Allowing CBMC
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red-black tree
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to insert arbitrary values for assignments to the pointers of the data-structure can
cause a complete reordering of the tree, inducing a large state space to be explored.
Thus, in this example, performing diagnosis requires more eﬀort then checking a
program with a small amount of nondeterminism or none at all.
We introduced two faults to the sources:
(i) To satisfy rule (ii), the ﬁrst node inserted to a tree is colored BLACK. This
assignment was changed to RED.
(ii) Every node ﬁrst is inserted to the tree like in a usual binary search tree. There-
fore the tree is traversed to ﬁnd the proper position for the new node. In the
traversion routine, a comparison was changed from <= to == leading to a
wrong order of the tree.
The ﬁrst fault resulted in only one element giving the correct line of the fault
for every test case. The second fault does not cause an incorrect tree for the ﬁrst
test cases. The second and third test case, however, lead to a diagnosis of three
expressions containing the correct line. The state space for the fourth test case
exceeded memory limits for the full diagnosis, but it was possible to check one by
one if a expression from a previous test cases was also a in the diagnosis for the
fourth test case. That way, we were able to rule out one expression and resulted in
a ﬁnal diagnosis with two elements.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a new approach to localize faults in C programs by constructing a
modiﬁed system that allows a given number of expressions to be changed arbitrarily.
The new system contains the inverted speciﬁcation from the original program. If
we can ﬁnd an error trace for the new system, we found expressions to repair the
original program.
We have demonstrated the applicability of the approach on two examples. The
run time of the approach can still be improved. A signiﬁcant portion of the time
is taken by parsing, unwinding and generating the internal representation of the
program. This representation does not change during calculation of the diagnosis
for a single program. Overall run time would be signiﬁcantly reduced by using
blocking clauses and rerun the SAT solver to ﬁnd the full diagnosis, instead of
rerunning the complete CBMC process.
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